Bearing Witness, Moral Responsibility and Distant Suffering by Hill, David
Hill, David ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-
0002-3849-1170 (2018) Bearing Witness, Moral Responsibility and 
Distant Suffering. Theory, Culture & Society, 36 (1). pp. 27-45.  
Downloaded from: http://ray.yorksj.ac.uk/id/eprint/3560/
The version presented here may differ from the published version or version of record. If 
you intend to cite from the work you are advised to consult the publisher's version:
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263276418776366
Research at York St John (RaY) is an institutional repository. It supports the principles of 
open access by making the research outputs of the University available in digital form. 
Copyright of the items stored in RaY reside with the authors and/or other copyright 
owners. Users may access full text items free of charge, and may download a copy for 
private study or non-commercial research. For further reuse terms, see licence terms 
governing individual outputs. Institutional Repository Policy Statement
RaY
Research at the University of York St John 
For more information please contact RaY at ray@yorksj.ac.uk
1 
 
Bearing Witness, Moral Responsibility and Distant Suffering 
 
The idea that contemporary media have shaped or transformed the way that we see, 
contemplate, and respond to suffering is now widespread. In his influential Seeing 
Things John Ellis (2000: 1) identified a ‘new modality of perception’ brought about, in 
particular, by television, and producing both a ‘powerless knowledge’ and a sense of 
‘complicity with what we see’. With this, says Ellis, we can no longer say that we did 
not know what was going on. Where there is famine, war, atrocity or disaster, we cannot 
claim that it passed us by since it no longer takes place beyond the range of our vision. 
Part of this transformation, then, is the constitution of what Stanley Cohen (2016: 15-
18) called the external bystander: those people who, as John Durham Peters (2001: 707) 
put it, ‘watched history unfold in their armchairs’. Televised suffering, bringing to the 
viewer its combination of hapless knowledge and complicity, presents what Ellis calls a 
‘mute appeal’ (2000: 11) – a televised call to responsibility – although his most famous 
contribution is in heralding the age of witnessing. This has been taken up by Fuyuki 
Kurasawa (2009: 93, 94), who identifies a generation in the grip of ‘witnessing fever’, 
as seen in the increasing number of media forms that present testimony and evidence, 
and our apparent enthusiasm for viewing them. For Kurasawa (2009: 95) bearing 
witness is made up of a number of elements, tasks shared both by those who produce 
media texts and by those to whom they are presented: speaking out about suffering 
2 
 
where otherwise there would be silence; providing interpretation where 
incomprehension might thrive; cultivating empathy in place of indifference; 
remembering events at risk of being forgotten, and preventing their recurrence. Barbie 
Zelizer (2002: 698) suggests that one of the key functions of bearing witness is that it 
helps return a community to a state of unity that existed prior to whatever trauma might 
have befallen it. Sue Tait (2011: 1221) argues that such traumatic events demand ‘some 
form of public response’, and understands bearing witness as a moral practice. This 
would be familiar to Kurasawa (2006: 95) for whom bearing witness is a mode of 
‘ethico-political labour’. As Tait (2011: 1222) reminds us, to bear is to assume a 
burden, and when we see the suffering of others – on our televisions, say – we are called 
to take on the burden of responsibility, to respond to what we see: to do something. So, 
bearing witness is more than just seeing: it is also a moral response, that is, to perform 
our responsibility.  
 
We may no longer be able to claim that we did not know, but seeing on its own is no 
substitute for responding, being aware is not necessarily to be responsible, and so 
bearing witness must do more moral work than mere observation or recognition if we 
are to say that contemporary media have brought about any sort of useful change in the 
way that we exist in relation to suffering. For Tait (2011: 1233) this moral work is best 
motivated when the media present suffering in such a way that it is affective, so that it 
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vitalises our emotional bond to different and dissimilar others, and moves the audience 
bodily towards response. Similarly, Lilie Chouliaraki (2006b) has argued that media 
coverage of suffering must be brought into a narrative order that presents the human 
face of suffering – or else audiences will not be morally activated. In what follows, it is 
argued that the moral value of narrative order in media presentations of suffering has 
been overstated, which results in placing the weight of responsibility on media 
producers rather than on audiences. In the first section it is argued that this 
overstatement is, in part, a result of a narrow account of the political and moral function 
of the aesthetic of the sublime. Whilst it may be tempting to dismiss spectacular 
imagery – terror attacks, natural disasters, industrial accidents, and so on – as providing 
little more than voyeuristic entertainment unless news producers not only show us what 
happened but tell us why it is wrong, by returning to the work of Immanuel Kant 
(2008), and then to the re-reading of this performed by Jean-François Lyotard (2009), it 
is possible to find an account of bearing witness to sublime violence that emphasises its 
role in taking society towards the better. In the second section it is argued that the 
overstatement of the moral necessity of narrative order is also, in part, a result of 
assuming moral responsibility is something that follows from a media presentation, as if 
it can be activated if the coverage is just so and never engaged if a fully humanised, 
emotionally moving story is missing. Whilst these kinds of affective narrations are 
taken to be desirable, and their absence in coverage of certain categories of people seen 
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to be suspicious, through an engagement with the work of Emmanuel Levinas it is 
shown that moral communication is present even in the most minimal, dots on maps and 
numbers dead, type of coverage. Moral responsibility is there, if we care to look closely 
enough, and so it is concluded that the dismissal of certain kinds of media coverage as 





In her analyses of the media coverage of the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 
and the subsequent invasion of Iraq by US and allied forces in 2003, Lilie Chouliaraki 
(2006a, 2006b, 2008c) utilises an idea of the sublime to argue that representations of 
suffering that do not move from images of spectacular magnitude to individuated stories 
are insufficient for mobilising moral sentiment. One of the ways that this sublimation 
occurs is through the use of the long shot. Chouliaraki (2006b: 70-71) compares the 
close up shots of the events of 11 September 2001 with long shots of the compromised 
skyline, arguing that the former brought viewers into moral proximity with the victims 
whilst the latter created a contemplative distance that lent itself more to voyeurism and 
self-reflection. For Chouliaraki the long shot dehumanises, giving precedence to the 
horror of magnitude over response to individual suffering, presenting Manhattan as if in 
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a painting, still and unmoving (2006b: 89, 92, 171). This, she says, creates an ‘eternal 
present’ (2006b: 171), appropriate for cool reflection but not for the urgency of moral 
response. Looking at the long shot, at smoke, fire and collapse on an urban scale, the 
audience, she argues (2006b: 180), were brought to think of the historical significance 
of what was happening, connecting the images to past events (Pearl Harbour, perhaps) 
or to other places (such as major European cities that may now be under threat), but not 
to the immediacy of moral responsibility for the sufferers, who are not depicted. 
 
With the attacks on the World Trade Centre, the long shot was supplemented by 
survivor testimony, interviews with victims’ loved-ones and sympathetic narration by 
news presenters, which create the sort of humanising presentation that Chouliaraki is 
after. That is to say, the images were subsequently brought into a narrative order that 
encouraged a sense of empathy for victims, as well as the denunciation of perpetrators. 
Other events do not receive the same attention. In her analysis of the media coverage of 
the bombing of the Iraqi capital in 2003, Chouliaraki (2006a: 263) argues that ‘the 
semiotic choices of the footage construe the bombardment of Baghdad in a “sublime” 
regime of pity, whereby the phantasmagoria of the spectacle obliterates the 
humanitarian quality of suffering and whereby the aesthetic of “shock and awe” takes 
over other ethical and political considerations’. The viewer is taken through a process of 
‘sublimation’, she says, that ‘discourages the spectators from feeling for or denouncing 
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the suffering’ (2006a: 267), encouraging instead contemplation of the shocking and 
awesome qualities of the aerial attack. This is achieved by showing neither the civilians 
bombed in their homes nor the aircrew doing the bombing, and by filming the 
bombardment from above and afar, together creating a spectacle of ‘immense intensity’ 
(2006a: 269), but without a human dimension. As Chouliaraki (2006a: 272) explains, 
the sufferer is represented in non-human terms, with focus on buildings and structures 
as targets; the victim in all this is described as ‘the city’, as Baghdad itself rather than its 
collective occupants and their individual lives. The result is a ‘panorama of obscure 
action’ (Chouliaraki, 2006a: 274), a magnitude of horror, a spectacle to be studied – but 
devoid of human agency. The audience’s capacity for pity is blocked, she concludes 
(2006a: 276). For Chouliaraki (2008c: 338), the sublime retains the distance in distant 
suffering; by emphasising awe and magnitude and spectacle it diminishes the ability of 
those watching these sorts of events to locate the locus of moral concern: the suffering 
other. This maximises the drama but sanitizes the suffering: we watch but we do not 
connect.  
 
Chouliaraki takes her understanding of sublimation from the work of Luc Boltanski 
(2005), for whom the sublime evokes neither denunciation of perpetrators nor moral 
sentiment towards victims, but a sort of contemplative despair. However, as Chouliaraki 
(2006a: 274) herself notes, there are other ways of thinking about the sublime. What 
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this account of sublimation lacks, and what we find in the work of Immanuel Kant 
(2008), is an emphasis on the pain of contemplating the sublime that produces states of 
humility and enthusiasm, and in turn a consideration of the political and moral 
dimensions given to this by Jean-François Lyotard (2009), where humility in the face of 
the sublime becomes an enthusiasm for something better. In his Critique of Judgement 
(2008), Kant contrasts beauty as the quality of objects, as found in nature, with the 
sublime as the representation of limitlessness to the imagination. This limitlessness 
contravenes ‘the ends of our power of judgement’ and does ‘violence, as it were, to the 
imagination’ (2008: 76). The sublime is about quantity rather than quality: a magnitude 
that is too much to be thought, that cannot be contained in thought, that exceeds the 
human capacity for thought. ‘Sublime’, writes Kant (2008: 78), ‘is the name given to 
what is absolutely great’, which is to say, great beyond all comprehension, beyond all 
comparison, ‘a greatness comparable to itself alone’ (2008: 80). Chaos, disorder and 
dissolution, for example, and insofar as their magnitude and power is sufficient, excite 
the idea of the sublime. Negativity and fear, as well as quantity, are also fundamental to 
the experience of the sublime: ‘This excess for the imagination’, writes Kant (2008: 88), 
‘is like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself’. The sublime makes us feel afraid, 
although those things that make us afraid are not sufficient to bring us to the sublime. 
But this fear can be positive. To attempt to hold magnitudes in the imagination that 
cannot possibly be thought inspires humility, which Kant (2008: 94) describes as ‘a 
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sublime temper of the mind’. That something forces us to confront what is more than 
we can think, even against our own sensuous interest, since it is painful to bear, and that 
it reminds us of the limitations of what it is to be human, is what takes the sublime from 
being merely terrifying, and moves us towards an attempt – however forlorn – to grasp 
what escapes our understanding.  
 
For Lyotard, this makes of it something usefully and powerfully moral. Lyotard’s 
account of the sublime takes the work of Kant as its starting point, and sticks faithfully 
to it for the most part. So, for Lyotard there are no sublime objects, only sublime 
feelings, and such feelings are awakened by ‘magnitude, force, quantity in its purest 
state, a “presence” that exceeds what imaginative thought can grasp at once in a form – 
what it can form’ (2004b: 53). This feeling of the sublime is not the feeling that 
something is great amongst others but of absolute greatness, such that no comparison 
between sublime events can be made. And so again we have a negative aesthetic, a 
confrontation with something that overwhelms the thinker and renders them powerless, 
and that does violence to the imagination by forcing it against the limits of what can be 
formed. ‘Sublime violence is like lightning. It short-circuits thinking with itself’ 
(Lyotard, 2004b: 54). For Lyotard, the sublime is a feeling that there is, but that I do not 
know what it is or what will happen next. That is to say, we are confronted by a 
magnitude, that there is something, something vast, but the violence this does arrests 
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our thinking, not only of what it is but what will happen with it. It is the feeling that 
something has to happen next – but I know not what it is. Lyotard (2004a: 92) calls this 
the ‘and what now?’ When thinking is arrested it seems possible that nothing might 
happen, that foreboding and dread and everything negative will win out, but there is 
also a contradictory pleasure, that we might welcome the unknown. Lyotard writes: 
‘What is sublime is the feeling that something will happen, despite everything, within 
this threatening void, that something will take “place” and will announce that not 
everything is over’ (2004a: 84). He  summarises the sublime feeling as follows: ‘a very 
big, very powerful object threatens to deprive the soul of any “it happens”, strikes it 
with “astonishment” ... The soul is thus dumb, immobilized, as good as dead’ (2004a: 
99). That is, unless it is brought back to life by an enthusiasm for the sprawling 
unknown that opens beyond the sublime event. The sublime demands a reaction, 
although it gives no clues as to what to do; it creates an impulse to act, even though it 
provides no basis to judge what action is the correct one; it demands that we find ways 
to speak for the event, even though it has arrested thought and derailed narrative: in 
short, it drives us to bear witness (see Williams 1998). This places the sublime in the 
domain of morality, which for Lyotard cannot be separated from aesthetics (form) or 




This moral function of the sublime is set out most thoroughly in Enthusiasm (2009). 
Here Lyotard suggests that we glimpse the sublime in events that do not seem to follow 
the predictable script of history, such as the French Revolution. History is understood 
here not only as the deeds of actors, but also the feelings of spectators who judge events 
in terms of what is just. In the face of the sublime this is achieved through a state of 
enthusiasm, a feeling not of the object but of the idea of humanity that the event evokes. 
So, amidst the chaos and disorder of revolution, say, the enthusiasm we might see from 
spectators is an expression of desire towards civil peace – even international peace. 
Lyotard (2009: 39) writes: 
 
The beautiful is not sufficient; it is merely a symbol of the good. But, because 
the sublime is the sentimental paradox, the paradox of experiencing publicly and 
de jure as a group that something which is “formless” alludes to a beyond of 
experience, it constitutes an “as if” presentation of the Idea of civil society and 
even cosmopolitan society, and thus of the Idea of morality, right where that 
Idea nevertheless cannot be presented, within experience. 
 
That is, when some event occurs that is not tautological with previous events, that 
breaks from the expected procession of history, by virtue of being radical it opens up 
the space beyond it to a radical moral response, a communal endorsement of a moral 
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state-of-affairs that previously did not exist, or at least was hitherto only weakly 
mobilised. One of Lyotard’s examples is the Holocaust, of which he writes: ‘an abyss 
opened up when an object capable of validating the phrase of the Idea of human rights 
must be presented’ (2009: 63). So, such an event not only demands a response – at once, 
moral, political and historical, in this instance the idea of universal human rights – but it 
also provides the ground on which we can think otherwise and go beyond what we have 
previously endorsed as a moral good. These abyssal events force us to judge without 
criteria, without any rulebook for containing the event within our current moral 
universe, such that the idea of what is just must be rethought. Whereas Zelizer’s account 
of bearing witness involves returning society to its status quo, Lyotard’s enthusiastic 
spectator is moved to take society ‘toward the better’ (2009: 37).  
 
This account of the historical significance of the spectator of sublime events provides a 
useful alternative to accounts of media events that suggest that unnarrated images of the 
spectacular are insufficient for grounding a moral response. It tallies with Kurasawa’s 
argument that ‘representational aporias’ (2009: 100) – what in Lyotard are called 
abyssal events – might be unintelligible but this does not mean that nothing can be done 
in response to them. We have to speak the unspeakable when the framework of normal 
understanding is shattered by events of incomparable magnitude. Bearing witness, for 
Kurasawa (2009: 101), would consist of confronting this ‘limit-experience’ in order to 
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gesture towards its universal significance. He offers examples of how this universal 
significance might then be mobilised that are similar in kind to Lyotard’s: the 
recognition of crimes against humanity in response to genocide and the emergence of 
treaties such as the United Nations-sponsored Millennium Development Compact as a 
result of globally visible poverty (see Kurasawa, 2009: 103-104). Bearing witness for 
Kurasawa is a largely political project, and, whilst the moral dimension appears evident 
if the response to the sublime is to meet radicality with radicality and push society 
towards the better, the concerns raised by Chouliaraki remain unaddressed. So, let us 
deal with them in turn.  
 
First, she has said that the sublime focus on magnitude does not lead to a moral 
response because it fails to represent the individual. We already partly have an answer 
to this through Lyotard, which is that a perfectly moral response can be made at a 
collective level of spectators when they share an enthusiasm for a new moral 
arrangement to be applied universally. This might be expressed through something like 
social media, not through denunciation of perpetrators or through sentimental gestures 
towards victims, but by coalescing around an Idea that would take society towards the 
better. For example, we saw this in the UK in 2017 with the online response to the 
Grenfell disaster, when users united around the idea that austerity, social 
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marginalisation and housing poverty were unacceptable in the face of catastrophic 
neglect (Bratchford 2017). 
 
Second, reflecting on the attacks on the World Trade Center, Chouliaraki has argued 
that spectators are brought to think of historical magnitude – past events, potential 
future attacks, the way that the world will never be the same again – rather than the 
specificity of the present suffering. This is a live concern, but Lyotard shows that it is 
precisely the historical magnitude of such events, the way that they derail the normal 
procession of occurrences, that opens up a radical horizon from which things can be 
changed for the better. In any event, there seems to be no strong argument for 
untangling the ethical, the political and the historical in the first place, something 
Chouliaraki would have to better motivate if we are to accept that historical magnitude 
is really a barrier to moral action.  
 
Third, Chouliaraki has suggested that the long shot frames a sublime image that 
encourages a contemplative distance that is self-indulgent. This is a weak claim, shared 
by Boltanski, in that it owes more to a historical use of the term sublime in sentimental 
fiction than in what philosophical use the concept can be put to when considering the 
presentation of events such as those on 11 September 2001 or the subsequent invasion 
of Iraq. It need not be the case that such contemplation is one of self-concern, and 
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Lyotard’s alternative account, of thinking of new ways to utter the unthinkable, has the 
benefit of at least picking out the experience of trying to make sense of something 
unimaginable – which might include, but is unlikely to be limited to, consideration of 
how this involves oneself. There is nothing wrong in and of itself with a moment of 
contemplation: it just depends on what you are contemplating.  
 
Fourth, Chouliaraki highlights the way that the coverage of the carpet bombing of 
Baghdad represented the victims in non-human terms, with excessive focus on 
buildings, compounds, the city itself and so on, and shows that the coverage failed to 
identify victims and perpetrators, focusing instead on shock and awe. Whilst this is 
clearly dehumanising, to argue in terms of the sublime that it has a material impact on 
moral responsibility is to confuse object with feeling. It is the feeling of the sublime, 
rather than whatever is depicted, that is morally mobilising. Chouliaraki has asserted 
that the media fail to animate a moral response when they do not direct us towards a 
human form of suffering to ameliorate or of wrong-doing to denounce. Yet this human 
presence is not necessary since in confrontation with the sublime, in thinking of 
limitlessness, we are brought to probe the very limits of the human condition: fragile 
bodies do not need to be on screen since the feeling of the sublime brings to mind the 
fragility of human existence in the face of greater forces. The human-level of the event 




Finally, to return to the question of the long shot, Chouliaraki has argued that the 
images of Baghdad, shown from above and from afar, were presented with inadequate 
narration that offered no direction for moral response. But the event as an abyss or 
representational aporia escapes any narration in the first place, at least in the moment of 
its eruption in history. When we consider the live broadcast of such events as they 
occur, it is by no means obvious that it is desirable for journalists or talking heads to 
immediately impose narrative order on what is fundamentally disordered – and not just 
because this is how terrorist attacks undertaken by Islamic extremists are explained as 
aviation accidents or terrorist attacks undertaken by white supremacists are ascribed to 
Islamic extremists. The problem is more fundamental than that of false narrative. As 
Paddy Scannell (2004) has argued, disasters strike without meaning, gaining sense only 
after the fact. Ellis (2009: 78) suggests that even live news events ‘are quickly brought 
into narrative order’, and Chouliaraki seems to hold this as a necessary condition for 
moral response. But there is that moment before the live event is brought into narrative 
order, however brief, and it is here in confrontation with the incomprehensible, the 
event as brute fact, that we encounter a moral demand that exists before the media 
allows us to pick and choose our responsibilities by narrating them this way or that, 
constructing moral hierarchies here and there. For Lyotard, narrating the event is a way 
of neutralising the event: a coping strategy (see Bennington, 1988). What we see before 
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this interested narration that seeks to contain the event, before this ‘particularization of 




In an essay on the Heysel Stadium Disaster of 1985, when football hooliganism led to 
the deaths of 39 supporters during the televised European Cup Final between Liverpool 
and Juventus, Jean Baudrillard (2009: 85-91) argues that we see a role-reversal, of 
football crowds usurping the players in creating their own spectacle for the cameras. He 
asks: ‘Now is this not precisely what is expected of the modern spectator? Is he not 
supposed to abandon his spectatorish inertia and intervene in the spectacle itself?’ 
(Baudrillard, 2009: 87). Baudrillard is here pointing to an emerging culture of 
participation, where exhortations to get involved replace passive consumption of the 
media, something we see perfected today through participatory media of various forms 
(reality television or social media, say). He is not impressed, but as Bernard Stiegler 
(2015: 27-30) argues, we might understand this yearning for participation as the 
signification of its loss. For Stiegler (2015: 51), this is the result of the symbolic misery 
of a media environment that restricts singularity by refusing ‘the unanticipatable’ and 
‘the incalculable’, offering aesthetic conditioning rather than encouraging aesthetic 
inquiry. Baudrillard (2009: 87) asks: ‘Where exactly does participation pass over into 
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too much participation?’ The answer should be that there can never be enough 
participation. It is morally fundamental that we shake off our spectatorish inertia and 
respond meaningfully to those in need, however they are presented on our screens and 
regardless of the aesthetic conditioning the media subject us to. 
 
If Lyotard’s account of enthusiasm in the face of the sublime does not seem urgent 
enough, coming much too late to help those in immediate need, then it is not such a 
difficult task to imagine a timelier moral enthusiasm. The images we receive, of the 
attacks on the World Trade Center, or of the carpet bombing of Baghdad, or of the 
neglectful catastrophe at Grenfell, are sublime as far as they force us to confront an 
unimaginable scale of human suffering. That we do not see the human face of suffering 
is not sufficient to make the claim that such images are not morally moving. They 
attempt to communicate a scale and intensity of suffering that we could not hope to 
understand, that cannot be replaced with a humanised story and a mental multiplication. 
The communication fails because its content is unimaginable, but in confronting the 
viewer with this sublime violence, the failure is productive: it brings about humility that 
not only is there suffering greater than my own, but suffering greater than I can hold in 
thought. Here we might say, as Emmanuel Levinas (2007: 27) would, that a 
confrontation with this sublime suffering consummates the idea of the infinite and 
shows the impossibility of reducing both the other and the suffering of the other to 
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objects of our intellect, that is, the impossibility of a totality of suffering. This 
experience, this encounter with something that resists the sovereignty of my intellect, is 
a profoundly moral one in that it calls into question what Levinas (2007: 43) calls the 
‘spontaneity’ of the individual. He sets this out as follows: 
 
It is the very revelation of a resistance to my powers that does not counter them 
as a greater force, but calls in question the naïve right of my powers, my 
glorious spontaneity as a living being. Morality begins when freedom, instead of 
being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent (2007: 84). 
 
Sublime violence, then, does not (just) confront the viewer with a quantity of sufferers 
that exceeds imagination, but a quantity of suffering that belongs to the other, both of 
which escape my grasp. This provides the conditions for what we might call a moral 
humility, not just that we cannot think through the intensity of suffering, such that we 
might be humbled by our own cognitive limitation, but where our own freedom seems 
arbitrary when we are confronted by reportage of levels of suffering that attack the 
freedom of the other to exist without harm – or even to exist at all. As Silverstone 
(2003: 479) argues, this humility brought about by a failure to fully comprehend is ‘a 
necessary precondition for our capacity to care for the other’. And if this to be the case, 
if humility is to have any moral function, then it must prompt action. There must be an 
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enthusiasm to transform this humility into response, an enthusiasm to intervene in the 
suffering of the other, or else what is the point of my freedom when that of the other is 
curtailed by events of such intense suffering? Such enthusiasm would consist of 
substituting the other’s concerns for your own (see Cohen, 2000: 28), putting yourself in 
harm’s way, and ‘giving’ as ‘a tearing from oneself despite oneself’ (Levinas, 2008: 
74). Lyotard’s or Kurasawa’s bearing witness as the mobilisation of an Idea can come 
later. But the immediate suffering of the other demands an immediate response, a moral 
enthusiasm born in the humility of contemplating sublime violence. If this is the case, 
then the sublime presentation of suffering in the media, the sorts of presentation 
discussed by Chouliaraki, maintains what Silverstone (2003, 2008) calls ‘proper 
distance’: the other may not be heard, their story may not be fleshed out, but the 
unintelligibility of their unique experience of suffering is communicated in the 
confrontation with the sublime, a confrontation that should bring humility and 
enthusiasm in profoundly moral measure.  
 
A question remains: what happens when there is not only a lack of attention to the 
stories of individual sufferers during media coverage, but also no sublime image? 
Without the magnitude, there is no humility to motivate the enthusiasm. So, we need to 
supplement our account of moral enthusiasm if it is to do enough work to ground moral 
responsibility in the face of such minimalist media presentation. This sort of coverage is 
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again characterised by the absence of emotionally-evocative, humanised accounts of 
suffering in news presentations of distant events. It displays what Chouliaraki (2008c: 
329) calls the symbolic power of transnational media: ‘the capacity of the media to 
selectively combine resources of language and image in order to present distant 
suffering as a cause of emotion, reflection and action for Western audiences’. This 
power, then, is exercised through the decisions made when creating news texts, 
decisions about how suffering is portrayed and narrated. Global victims are placed 
within a hierarchy of suffering, wherein those that are more culturally proximate to the 
intended audience generate more evocative coverage and those that are distant are 
afforded only a superficial attention. The narrative format of news is organised 
according to a ‘hierarchy of relevance’ (Scannell 2004: 579), dividing people up into 
worthy and unworthy victims (Höijer 2004: 516), and rendering unprivileged victims as 
‘a general category of unfortunates’ (Kyriakidou 2015: 227). For Chouliaraki (2006b) 
we see this power at play when news producers decide to cover an event from the studio 
rather than on location, replacing victim testimony with a verbal text from the news 
anchor and reducing the geography of suffering to mere dots on maps; when words and 
abstractions stand in for images of suffering; when victims are reduced to numbers – of 
killed, wounded, displaced, and so on; when brief descriptive narratives are chosen 
ahead of in-depth explanation of the cause and effect of the event of suffering, rendering 
events as random and isolated; and when victims are not given a voice to say something 
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about their own suffering. This is an act of ‘misframing’ that reproduces the fault lines 
of global inequality and marginalises non-Western victims (Chouliaraki 2013: 110; Joye 
2009: 58). As Stijn Joye (2009: 52) argues, this sort of coverage depersonalises those in 
pain or peril, portraying them as passive agents in a way that maximises the emotional 
distance between the audience and those caught up in harmful events, making it difficult 
or impossible for an audience to identify with them. Chouliaraki (2006b: 97) argues that 
this minimalism restricts the ‘ethical appeal’ of the suffering that is reported on, such 
that the news report fails to make a moral demand on the audience to respond to the 
suffering they see. This position reveals Chouliaraki’s stated assumption, that ‘the moral 
horizon of the spectator resides in media discourse’ (2006b: 46), such that the textual 
quality of the mediation constitutes the possibility for moral response (2008a: 832). This 
places the burden of moral responsibility on media producers, casts the media text as the 
locus for moral activity, and suggests that morality is only possible dependent on certain 
kinds of news presentation (see Corpus Ong, 2009: 450). Where the media do not 
present a strong appeal to action, Chouliaraki (2006b: 191) argues, the viewer is not 
constituted as a moral agent – and this leads, she claims, to a ‘moral vacuum’ (2006b: 
216). The presentation of suffering, she suggests, needs to be supplemented first of all 
with an understanding of the event as an ‘emotional occasion’ that demands action 
(Chouliaraki, 2006b: 106), and secondly with some attempt to indicate a practical 
response the viewer can take. This first part is supported by audience analyses, where 
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respondents have pointed to the lack of emotional development of stories of distant 
suffering as being a justification for their own lack of moral engagement (see 
Kyriakidou, 2015: 227). For Chouliaraki (2008b), the media must expose the audience 
to dispositions towards suffering, making them feel something if they are to make them 
do something. Like Tait (2011), then, she calls for a more personal presentation, one 
that is altogether more human and more emotional such that viewers are moved and 
move to act in response to the suffering they encounter through the media. Otherwise, 
as Maria Kyriakidou (2015: 227) argues, ‘the distant other fails to enter the moral space 
of the viewer’. The second part involves some concrete possibility for action being 
presented. This might be by indicating how viewers can donate to or volunteer for 
charity organisations or NGOs that are working in the area. Without humanised stories, 
emotional engagement, and a direct steer on how to help, Chouliaraki (2008a: 842) 
concludes, the viewer is ‘freed from the moral obligation to act’.  
 
It is not the purpose here to argue against the idea that hierarchies of suffering are 
unethical. It is taken as self-evident that they are, and that the choices made in 
presenting some victims as fully autonomous persons whilst depersonalising coverage 
to the extent that other victims are dehumanised, is morally wrong at best, and likely 
carries racist and culturally imperialist overtones that are rightly condemned. The 
argument here is that whilst minimalist presentation is unethical, it is not self-evident 
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that it should be seen to alter the moral responsibilities of its audience. This is an 
argument made in two parts: first, that even when suffering is denied a human face its 
presentation still constitutes a moral encounter that makes demands of the viewer to 
assume responsibility for that suffering; and second, that we cannot read responsibilities 
from media texts, assuming that news categories pick out moral categories, nor expect 
that these media texts will be action-guiding. Overall, the argument to be made is one 
for a greater recognition of the moral responsibility of the audience – as well as the 
difficulties of enacting it. 
 
The first argument involves a consideration of the moral quality of indirect 
communication. Chouliaraki (2006b: 105) has written: ‘The absence of a person, 
somebody with a name and a face, deprives the encounter between spectators and 
sufferers of any sense of humanness’. In setting out his moral philosophy, Levinas 
(2007: 50) writes: ‘The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of 
the other in me, we here name face’. The face in this sense is a marker or trace of 
something beyond my cognisance, something that cannot be represented for the other. 
The face is a sort of boarded up window into the soul of the other person. But what it 
lacks in opening the other to my understanding, it makes up for in opening a moral 
encounter that sustains enthusiasm by exposing us to vulnerability. As Levinas (2007: 
75) observes: ‘The nakedness of [the] face extends into the nakedness of the body that is 
24 
 
cold and that is ashamed of its nakedness’. The face is a ‘destitute authority’ 
(Pinchevski, 2005: 217) that calls us to moral response without force, in a manner 
‘fundamentally pacific’ (Levinas, 2007: 171); whilst the encounter with the other calls 
into question my powers, it does so from the vulnerable position of exposure rather than 
from a position of superior power. As Amit Pinchevski (2005: 217) explains: 
 
The “power” of the face, so to speak, is in its powerlessness; the call the face 
puts forth affects precisely because of the Other’s weakness. The frailty of the 
face is paradoxically the source of its command: its address is what exposes my 
primordial responsibility towards the Other. 
 
The sort of minimal coverage that might be dismissed in terms of its lack of human face 
more precisely presents the frailty of the face, such that the weak presentation of the 
distant other in news media is a manifestation of vulnerability that only serves to 
highlight the need for a moral response to the suffering. Moral responsibility is about 
protecting and helping the vulnerable, and the refusal of the media to show the human 
face of certain categories of victims should reinforce in us the idea that these are the 
most vulnerable of all. Levinas (2008: 100) sets out an idea of moral encounter that 
seeks sensibility beyond ‘the circulation of information it becomes’, something 
‘irreducible to consciousness and thematization’, an encounter with the other ‘who 
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cannot be resolved into “images” or be exposed in a theme’. Minimal coverage conveys 
a naked face and constitutes an ‘indirect communication’ (Cohen, 2000: 31) of a moral 
demand. We do not need framing by the news to lose sight of the face of the other; we 
do so all the time, since the face is a weak force, a call to help but not a guarantee that 
help will come. But everything communicated indirectly points to a face. We find a 
trace in the statistics, in the maps, in the brief narrations of distant tragedies. ‘The 
source of all signification lies not in signs relating to signs […] but more deeply, more 
seriously, more painfully, in the moral significance of the face that obligates’ (Cohen, 
2000: 32). We can be responsible or not, respond as actors or remain inert as spectators 
– in short, be moral or immoral – but we cannot blame our tools. We can no more hide 
behind our television screens – or the presentation of suffering on them – than we can 
hide from the destitute on our streets behind blacked out car windows or locked gates at 
the perimeter of our homes (Cohen, 2000: 35). To be told of suffering and to protest that 
the coverage did not do enough to motivate a response is akin to stepping over a 
contorted mass in a sleeping bag on the pavement, and claiming that there was no way 
of determining that there was a homeless person inside. Neither is a reasonable response 
to the demands of moral life; these are weak gestures that amount to ‘accepting the rules 
of a game, but cheating’ (Levinas, 2007: 173). We need to demand more of ourselves – 




To insist on a sort of Goldilocks News, where the presentation of suffering has to be just 
so if it is motivate and mobilise a distant audience, is to assume that, because the 
presentation of news can be straightforwardly categorised in terms of moral function – 
personalisation, affective engagement, dehumanisation, hierarchies of suffering, and so 
on – that moral responsibility can be read off these categorisations. The emphasis is too 
fully on the media text. The moral encounter should be understood as an encounter 
between the viewer and the person who is suffering, not between the viewer and the 
news presentation. We should not expect media conditions that allow the other to enter 
our moral space, but instead to actively enter the moral space of the other for ourselves. 
We should demand more enthusiasm. A medium is merely something that lies in the 
middle, something Sybille Krämer (2015: 36) observes is too readily forgotten in media 
analysis. The mistake when reflecting on distant suffering is to treat the medium as the 
object, rather than a middle ground between spectator and sufferer that retreats to the 
background when the moral encounter is consummated. There are three useful 
consequences if we take such an approach.  
 
First, once such an intimate moral relationship can be said to be in place, we can 
motivate a much more urgent and irrevocable sense of responsibility. Scannell (2000: 
19) argues that the for-anyone-as-someone structure of media appears as if it is only for 
me, the viewer, but that the viewer understands that it addresses millions of others at the 
27 
 
same time, creating a shared experience: ‘We do not treat what we read and see and 
hear every day as if it was a purely personal matter’. We should. An I-other relationship 
does far more moral work than does Scannell’s ‘we-ness’. As Levinas (2007: 245) 
argues: ‘To utter “I” ... means to possess a privileged place with regard to 
responsibilities for which no one can replace me and from which no one can release 
me’. To move the moral encounter from the text to the other, and so create a 
relationship that transcends spectatorship, is to emphasise the imperative of the 
audience to act. The viewer cannot shirk or wait for others to act in their place.  
 
Second, this approach allows us to transcend the limitation of what media producers and 
contributors might understand as appropriate moral response. Pinchevski (2005: 216) 
suggests that responsibility means ‘exceeding rather than following social norms’. 
Whilst the media can provide a moral education, responsibility should involve asking 
more of oneself than any institution might, including the media, whose suggestions too 
often echo the unimaginative responses found in Boltanski (2005): putting your hand in 
your pocket or spreading the word. If we are to take society towards the better, which is 
to think of moral responsibility as something radical, then we have to go beyond the 
conservative moral education performed by the media. This would represent the kind of 
rejection of moral authority called for in their different ways by Levinas and by 
Friedrich Nietzsche (2013). The two progress towards radically different conclusions, 
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with Nietzsche calling for a rejection of pity and Levinas for an infinite responsibility; 
Nietzsche arguing that we should see ourselves as superior to others (nobles above a 
herd) and Levinas for us to lift the other up into a superior position to ourselves. But 
both call for a break from traditional morality and ethical law, and a re-evaluation or 
revision of values, and it is worth noting, as David Boothroyd (2009) does, that 
Nietzsche’s supposed rejection of compassion is overstated, and that his message is 
most strongly one of caution against over-identification with the suffering of others. As 
such, the overcoming of suffering is central to both thinkers: for Nietzsche, because it is 
‘a manipulative demand for pity’ (Boothroyd 2009: 162); for Levinas, because the ‘I’ 
cannot suffer the other’s suffering for them. Whilst Alphonso Lingis (2009) points out 
that Nietzsche’s admonition not to intervene in the suffering of the other, since they 
might gain strength from it, runs contrary with Levinas’ demand to alleviate said 
suffering, we should see these two responses as two sides of the same coin. That is, 
since Levinas recognises that the other is fundamentally unknowable and that we cannot 
suffer their suffering, any moral response to them is inherently risky; we might take 
away from them something beneficial, as Nietzsche says, or we might aggravate or 
intrude on their suffering in ways that cannot be anticipated. But if the choice is 
between responding or not responding, then we should be firmly on the side of the 




This takes us to the final point: to focus on an intimate moral encounter rather than the 
informative role of the media would better reflect the unpredictability and risk inherent 
to all moral response. To assert that the media ought to be action-guiding or else it 
cannot be said to dispose the viewer to act, as Chouliaraki does (see 2006a: 277), is to 
assume that moral disposition is dependent on guidance, or on practicability. Moral life 
is a contingent, messy affair, and no amount of tidying up by the media can make it any 
easier to navigate. Often, what would be the correct advice in respect to responding to 
one other would be misjudged for another other; there might be competing or 
conflicting demands on our moral responsibility that make it impossible to respond in a 
way that is wholly good or that does not do some harm to someone, even if only by 
omission: moral response cannot be universalised or else it is not a response to the other 
at all. Sometimes there simply is not an obvious response to suffering, but it does not 
follow that the inability of the media to present one translates to the absence of 
responsibility. Where response is frustrated, where it cannot be enacted, we have not a 
voyeur, as Chouliaraki (2008a: 838) suggests, but a figure of moral reality, an 
individual responsible for all the suffering they encounter but who will always fall short 
in that responsibility. This is not to say that we are freed from our obligation to act, but 
that moral life is one of constant failure. We never live up to our moral responsibilities 




In summary, we should ask more of the viewer as a moral agent at the same time that 
we ask the media to be more ethical in producing content. In wanting or trying to 
respond we can and will be frustrated, but we do not get off the moral hook simply by 
virtue of variations in news coverage. The sorts of media presentations of violence and 
suffering discussed above should not be seen to derail moral responsibilities. Bearing 
witness to sublime violence demands humility and enthusiasm, both of which have been 
shown to be useful moral concepts; minimal presentations, it has been argued, open up 
indirect encounters that are no less moral than those generated by affective coverage; 
and the idea that the media should be action-guiding, or else responsibility cannot be 
communicated, has been questioned, since responsibility should exceed social 
expectations, and in any event is not contingent on the possibility of enacting a 
response, remaining in place even where such a response is impossible. None of this is 
intended to discount media analysis that focuses on the aesthetic presentation of news, 
which frequently and persuasively demonstrates the skewed ethics of news production. 
The purpose, instead, has been to shift moral responsibility some way back towards the 
audience. Responsibility is constant and infinite; it is consummated in the encounter 
with the other beyond the medium, not in the consumption of the media text. Without 
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